Corporate Security Governance

Corporate Security Governance at the Global Workplace:

Introducing a Social Dimension to Transnational Corporate Security Management.

INTRODUCTION

Security has a wide range of conceptual connotations, which appear to muddle the attempt to conduct academic research into corporate security as an ‘embryonic discipline’ (Gill, 2006:1)[i]. The theoretical approach to the role and nature of security structures and security management is influenced by ‘individuals, community, environment and organizations (particularly the state)’ (Manunta and Manunta, 2006:654)[ii]. The theoretical interpretation of the term ‘security’ can describe  an objective state of being protected from threats or danger, a subjective perception of feeling safe, or the pursuit of either of these (Zedner, 2003)[iii]. Johnston and Shearing (2003) describes the range of meanings embraced by the term, from physical safety, to emotional, psychological and financial well-being. They further define promotion of security as ‘intentional actions whose purpose is to provide guarantees of safety to subjects, both in the present and in the future’ (Johnston and Shearing, 2003:15)[iv]. Loader and Walker (2006) emphasize three main sociological dimensions of security. First they see the presence of security and stability as a ‘foundational presence’, a required condition for the pursuit of other social goals. Secondly, they highlight the social dimension of security, in the sense that the security of the individual depends on the security of others. Finally they accentuate the constitutive dimension of security, describing the fundamental qualities of promoting security in establishing and maintaining a sense of the social or the collective. The pursuit of security ‘helps to construct and sustain our “we feeling” – our very felt sense of “common publicness”’ (Loader and Walker, 2006:191)[v]. Seen in a corporate perspective the theoretical concepts governing the pursuit of security calls for a ‘principled framework’ to ensure a pragmatic approach that optimizes security arrangements as a basic condition for growth through promotion of a social dimension, which enables a sense of the collective within the organisation (Jones, 2006)[vi].

Gill, Fisher and Bowie conclude that there is a need ‘to develop workable frameworks to guide policy and to advance both the research and policy agendas to the next level of understanding, theorizing, hypotheses testing, and implementing and evaluating newly developed prevention interventions’ (Gill et al, 2002:210)[vii]. Considering corporate operational security Gill’s ‘Applied Business Crime Management’ (Gill, 1998)[viii] provides a workable principled framework, which enables structured considerations of mitigation measures adjusted to the individual organisation, and the social context in which the organisation exists. The social dimension of provision of security within a given organisation, public or private, is the subject of this paper.

Organisational culture is a general concept, which is difficult to explain precisely (Mullins, 2007:721)[ix]; however, the concept generally describes the social dimension of an organisation. The social dimension within a given organisation is characterized by the social behavioural patterns of the individuals populating the organisation. Staff dishonesty and workplace violence are essential elements of the behavioural patterns within the organisation, which demand the attention of security structures. In recent years theoretical concepts encompassing staff dishonesty and workplace violence have advanced to the forefront of academic interest. The extensive body of empirical findings related to these particular manifestations of organisational cultural behaviour is of paramount importance in explaining organisational social behaviour. I will primarily utilize studies of staff dishonesty and workplace violence as the conceptual framework in a discussion of the cultural influences determining the nature of security structures within organisations.    

The text will proceed in three stages, firstly conducting a review of the relevant literature with the purpose of exploring general definitions of organisational cultures. Secondly, the paper will explore studies pertaining to staff dishonesty and workplace violence seen as decisive elements of organisational cultures that influence the nature of security management practices. Thirdly, the paper will discuss the nature of security structures in a role of promoting response to dysfunctional organisational cultures with a particular focus on promoting accountability in transnational organisations.

The paper concludes that the social dimension of organisational cultures determinedly influence the nature of security within a given organisation and require security structures to adopt interdisciplinary approaches.

DEFINING AND MEASURING ORGANISATIONAL CULTURES 

Organisational culture is an idea in the field of organisational studies and management that describes the psychology, attitudes, experiences, beliefs, behaviour and values of an organisation. Review of the literature across various academic disciplines presents a number of definitions of the term organisational culture. Hill and Jones (2001)[x] defines organisational culture as ‘the specific collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organisation and that control the way they interact with each other and with stakeholders outside the organisation’.

In general, there is no apparent theoretical consensus on the meaning or application of cultural analysis to organisations. Brown (1998) presents a number of different definitions to the concept; however, these definitions are at times conflicting.[xi]

Organisational structures, cultures, and the environment are closely intertwined. The relationship between the three becomes accentuated in situations referred to as organisational change or development. Due to changes in the environment where organisations exist, structural and cultural changes are required in response to these dynamics in order for the organisation to thrive, or indeed to survive. Lee and Lawrence emphasises the dynamic interrelations between structures and cultures (Lee and Lawrence, 1991).[xii] Subsequently the organisational culture of any given organisation cannot be analysed without viewing the relations to the organisational structure. A number of scholars attempt to capture the influence of organisational cultures through the definition of various types of cultures. Handy (1993) describes a typology of organisational culture, the factors influencing these cultures and the implications for organisational structures (Handy, 1993).[xiii] Deal and Kennedy (1982) categorise four generic types of corporate cultures determined by two main factors: the risk associated with the organisation’s activities and the way organisational factors and employees receive positive feedback on decisions and strategies (Deal and Kennedy, 1982).[xiv]

Occupational psychology literature provides several attempts to describe and understand the various elements of organisational culture (Johnson, Scoles and Whittington, 2005[xv]; Naylor, 2004[xvi]; Morgan, 1986).[xvii] Brown (1998) among others identifies a number of elements, which comprise organisational culture, and suggests that these elements of culture are influential at different levels. Schein (2004)[xviii] views basic underlying assumptions as the deepest level of culture. Repeated successful solutions to problems become taken for granted and these implicit assumptions guide the behaviour and values of group members. According to Schein, basic assumptions are the essence of organisational cultures, and he concludes that the essence of organisational cultures consists of a set of ‘unspoken rules’ that exist without conscious knowledge of the members of the organisation. Over time the invisibility of the attributes at the deepest level of the culture becomes reinforced, which further complicates access in studies or casual interviews. Values and behaviour become manifestations that reflect the essence of the culture. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to examine the functions of organisational cultures and the impact the behavioural patterns of such cultures on the organisation as a whole.

Organisational cultures perform several functions, influencing the performance and effectiveness of an organisation. Harrison and Stokes (1992)[xix] emphasize the importance of cultures and suggest that organisational culture affects ‘most aspects of organizational life’ (Harrison and Stokes, 1992:1). This statement is further supported by Egan (1994)[xx] and Reigle (2001).[xxi] Morgan (1986)[xxii] describes culture as the ‘normative glue’ holding the organisation together. Cultures, where employees are aligned to organisational values are commonly phrased as ‘strong’ cultures; however, a body of literature indicates that organisational cultures also hold a dark side, which negatively influences the organisational climate and critically impacts on the performance of the organisation and its employees. This phenomenon is commonly described as ‘weak’ cultures.

While the analysis of organisational cultures mentioned above primarily takes an offset in anthropological, sociological, psychological or organisational management approaches to the subject issue, a criminological approach should be pursued to fully encompass the conceptual framework of the relations between provision of security and organisational culture. The effectiveness of an organisation is generally exposed to both internal and external threats. Organisational cultures and security structures respond differently to these types of threats. In the following the role and structure of security will be evaluated in relation to internal threats, primarily described as employee dishonesty and workplace violence.

CULTURES OF VIOLENCE AND DISHONESTY

Employee dishonesty is considered a form of occupational crime. The phenomenon is the subject of much research and definitions have virtually all specified that such crimes take place during the course of a legitimate occupation; involve a violation of trust; and are committed primarily for the benefit of the perpetrator either financially or in terms of social status. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) has defined the term ‘occupational fraud’.[xxiii] A plethora of different studies have suggested that employee dishonesty is one of the most widespread, pervasive and costly forms of crime. Within the US retail business the monetary costs of employee dishonesty are estimated to reach hundreds of billions of dollars, resulting in an inflation of prices of consumer items by 10 to 15 percent (Friedrichs, 2004).[xxiv] The most widely accepted definition of staff dishonesty was offered by Hollinger and Clark (1983:1).[xxv]  Specifically within this phenomenon literature describes a wide range of behavioural patterns, which comprises white collar crime, fraud, and theft. Staff dishonesty is identified within two main forms of employee theft, namely property deviance and production deviance. The former refers to situations in which employees illegally acquire or damage tangible property or organisational assets, whereas the latter concerns counterproductive behaviour that violates the formally proscribed expectations of daily work production.

Several sources conclude that employee dishonesty originates within the normative characteristics of the workplace.  Analysing workplace related crime and deviance, Hollinger and Davies (2006)[xxvi] note that a ‘Culture of Dishonesty’ can be derived from theories explaining the influence of organisational cultures on organisational behavioural patterns. Ott (1989)[xxvii] emphasizes organisational culture as a set of shared meanings and understandings, which results in an organisational behaviour affected by employees’ ‘cognition and perception of reality’. Cherington and Cherington (1985)[xxviii] accentuate the various peer subcultures of dishonesty that exist as an important component within organisational cultures. Parilla, Hollinger and Clark (1988)[xxix] showed that such peer subcultures become a guiding force of deviant or counterproductive employee behaviour. Employees become vulnerable from peer pressure and the informal rules of such subcultures take precedence over formal regulations issued by the organisation’s management. Shover and Hoechstetler (2002)[xxx] and Sutherland (1949)[xxxi] elaborate on the importance of peer interaction and association, through which employees are taught dishonest behaviour. Shover and Hoechstetler consider the shared vocabulary and language among organisational informal structures as a prominent feature in minimizing guilt and shame normally associated with deviant behaviour. The ‘techniques of neutralization’ introduced by Sykes and Matza (1957)[xxxii] underline the importance of common justifications offenders use to negate guilt or remorse within organisational subcultures. Horning (1970)[xxxiii] discovered that employee subcultures engaging in property theft establish a vocabulary, or informal set of values, which contains definitions of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.

In general, a well-documented body of research presents consistent findings, indicating that employee dishonesty originates within the employees’ perceptions of how they are treated by management.

A different body of literature examining workplace violence provides the theoretical foundation underpinning the argument that weak organisational cultures are greatly influenced by abusive organisational structures. There is no internationally agreed definition of workplace violence (Chappel and Di Martino, 2000).[xxxiv] The European Commission has agreed to a commonly used definition.[xxxv] A number of typologies have been developed to address workplace violence (Mayhew and Chappel, 2001).[xxxvi] The International labour Organisation (ILO) has defined violence to cover both physical and psychological behaviours (Verdugo and Vere, 2003).[xxxvii] In Britain, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), in charge of regulating health and safety related risk in the workplace, defines work-related violence as: ‘Any incident in which a person is abused, threatened or assaulted in circumstances related to their work.’[xxxviii] In Australia the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) put forth a similar definition (1999:1).[xxxix] In addition to these various definitions of the phenomenon, scholars have expanded the scope of workplace violence to refine the characteristics of organisational violence. The work of Rayner (2005) reveals that ‘where a threat is internal, there are two forms of abuse’ (Rayner, 2005:60).[xl] She categorizes abuse within organisations into two main types: ‘Negative Inter-personal Behaviour’ (NiB) and ‘Negative Organizational Behaviour’ (NoB). Common aspects of both types of behaviour are the sequential occurrence of relatively insignificant incidents, which evolve into a spiral of conflict if left without remedial actions. Studies describe this phenomenon (Einarsen, 2000[xli]; Harlos and Pinder, 1999[xlii]; Liefooghe and Mackenzie, 2003[xliii]). Extensive studies have been conducted into the financial impact and negative health effects originating from workplace violence (e.g. Chappel and Di Martino, 2000; [xliv] Di Martino et al., 2003[xlv]; Fisher and Peek-Asa[xlvi]; Hoel, Sparks and Cooper, 2001).[xlvii] Among a body of literature reporting the extent of the influence of organisational characteristics Snyder et al. (2005)[xlviii] highlight poor work organisation and inequitable workloads as undermining employees’ perception of management. Licu and Fisher (2005)[xlix] uncover a body of research, which describes the passive or active roles of organisations in creating oppressive or violent cultures. ‘The organizational culture may permit or even reward WV [workplace violence] and other negative behaviours’ (Licu and Fisher, 2005:243).

In summary, organisational cultures appear to express the psycho-social fabric of any given organisation. Studies on differences in organisational cultures among American and Japanese auto-manufacturers confirm that strong cultures promote organisational success, while weak cultures have a detrimental effect on the organisational output (Schein, 1990).[l] Studies of both employee dishonesty and workplace violence reveal a relationship between job dissatisfaction and employee dishonesty across the entire spectrum of organisational cultures. Bamfield finds that ‘motivation and perceived risk may be determinants of staff theft’ (Bamfield, 1998:123).[li] Employee dishonesty and workplace violence appear to be the most evident manifestations or symptoms of weak cultures. Several studies confirm that disgruntled employees engage in a culture of dishonesty (Hollinger and Clark, 1982[lii]; Greenberg, 1997[liii]; Tucker, 1889[liv]; Huiras, Uggen and McMorris, 2000).[lv] In addition to these job-dissatisfaction and workplace-equity theories Davies and Hollinger refer to rational choice theories and routine activities theories (Cohen and Felson, 1979)[lvi] for explanations of the root causes motivating employees to offend; however, in a specific relation to organisational cultures these theories are of less interest.

At first glance it appears that the culture of an organisation determines the nature of its security and that the influence of the organisational culture can be measured; however, organisational culture within any given organisation is determined by a diversity of factors, which complicates the identification of one specific measuring method or universal definition of an appropriate theoretical conceptual framework. In order to determine the nature of managing and providing security, social functions and characteristics of both positive and negative influential aspects of organisational cultures must be analysed in a multi-disciplinary perspective. This argument is supported by psychological, sociological, anthropological, and criminological theories in guidance of pragmatic approaches to provision of security, which is adjusted to the needs of the individual organisation’s structure, culture and management philosophy.

Considering the recognized ‘intangible characteristics’ of organisational cultures (Handy, 1993), the controversial challenge of identifying correlates of employee dissatisfaction and organisational climates cause difficulties in precisely measuring the extent to which organisational cultures determine the nature of security structures. A concise definition of the dynamics of the interrelation between organisational culture and security structures appears to be limited to general terms and definitions. In general it can be summarized that weak cultures out of necessity will determine the nature of security arrangements to a greater extent than strong organisational cultures. 

 

THREATS TO THE ORGANISATION 

No direct theoretical link between employee dishonesty and workplace violence has been established; however, both are manifestations of a dysfunctional organisational culture, which is indicative of employee dissatisfaction towards abusive management structures, work environment, salaries or other grievances. Empirical data from a wide range of sources emphasise that both tangible and intangible costs incurred as a result of staff dishonesty and workplace violence pose a significant threat to the health of any organisation. It is necessary to define the threat in order to determine appropriate response.

ILO considers workplace violence that may take place between employees, including managers and supervisors as ‘Internal Workplace Violence’. ‘External workplace Violence’ occurs between employees and other persons present at the workplace such as, customers, clients or the general public (ILO, 2003).[lvii] Bowie’s typologies of workplace violence fundamentally follow this approach by dividing workplace violence into two main groups: internal and external threats. External threats comprise ‘intrusive’ and ‘consumer related’ violence, internal threats are described as ‘relationship’ and ‘organisational violence’ (Bowie, 2002:6).[lviii] External threats have been observed to influence organisational cultures, and organisational cultures have a potential negative influence on the environment in which the organisation exists (Bowie, 2005);[lix] however, this paper will elaborate on a discussion to internal threats seen in relation to organisational cultures. 

THREATS ORIGINATING WITHIN THE ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

Specifically in relation to internal threats the influences of organisational cultures on the nature of provision of a secure work environment appear to exist in a polarization between weak and strong cultures. The nature of the role and structure of security responses to internal threats appears to be determined by the level of delinquent characteristics of the given organisational culture. Accordingly, security structures existing within a strong organisational culture will enable the security manager to focus on parts of the conventional spectre of security concerns, such as fire-safety, accident prevention, physical asset protection, access control and external threats from customers or burglars; however, weak organisational cultures will shift the emphasis of security structures towards the internal manifestations of the delinquent culture, which requires emphasis on prevention and deterrence of criminal behaviour, violence, harassment and wilful negligence within the organisation. In order to manage employee dishonesty Speed (2005) recommends two main strategic approaches, which are termed ‘control’ and ‘support’ strategies. The empirical foundation for his theory shows a relationship between age of offenders and their length of service with the organisation. Speed’s empirical findings support theories regarding the presence and influence of organisational cultures mentioned above. Speed concludes that ‘Controlling employee dishonesty is not a question of finding the right strategy, but of matching the right strategy to the right group of people,’ (Speed, 2005:178)[lx]. As such Speed’s recommendations appear to move beyond the traditional role of corporate security structures. The same observation is made in regard to workplace violence. Speer (2003) [lxi] refers to the guidelines issued by the US Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1998, whereby employers are required to establish risk analysis, administrative and environmental controls to minimize victimization of employees. Similar legislative and regulatory approaches have been introduced in many other countries. Licu and Fisher conclude that ‘the safety and security of workers and organizations must be at the forefront of all research and programs and policy development and evaluation’ (Licu and Fisher, 2006:254). Several sources indicate that staff dishonesty and workplace victimization, perpetration and their effects are realities of the global workplace.

Hofstede (2001)[lxii] established that organisational behaviour is affected by national and regional cultures. He identified five dimensions of culture in his study of national influences. These cultural dimensions suggest that national or regional cultural heritage must be considered when adjusting corporate and organisational cultures, management structures and security structures across the various geographical locations within the global workplace where transnational organisations operate. In continuation of Hofstede’s observations, Licu and Fisher examine workplace violence in a global context, and recognize the existence of inadequate organisation-specific policies, which fail to regulate or penalize violent behaviour (Licu and Fisher, 2006:229). Chappel and Martino (2002)[lxiii] observe the existence of cultural values that tolerate violent behaviour. National or regional cultural values are contributing factors for workplace violence. Bamfield’s ‘European Theft Barometer’, analysing the European dimension of theft from shops, further indicate national fluctuations in employee dishonesty (Bamfield, 2005:132)[lxiv]. Although his analysis does not directly focus towards national cultural variables, it identifies differences in national attitudes and legal sanctions towards the same type of internal criminal behaviour.

CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY AND THE NATURE OF CORPORATE SECURITY

In theory the role and nature of security structures are focused towards the promotion of the organisational goals and protection of assets. The challenge facing security management within any organisation therefore strives to support management in bringing about organisational cultures, which promote safety, job satisfaction, team effectiveness and organisational success. In summary, national cultural values influence organisational cultures, which in turn determine the nature of security responses required to encounter internal threats. The need for new response strategies to encounter internal threats at the global workplace demands a revision of the role of security structures. This provides a shift in the conventional roles of security structures towards emphasis on security strategies, which are able to adopt interdisciplinary dimensions through ‘interfacing not just with criminology, sociology, and criminal justice studies, but with perspectives and methodologies drawn from inter alia cultural, media and urban studies, philosophy, postmodern critical theory, cultural and human geography, anthropology, social movement studies, and other ‘action’ research approaches’ (Hayward and Young, 2006:102-3).[lxv] The most crucial influence of organisational cultures on the role of security structures must be the requirement for these structures to develop strategies far beyond the conventional realm of corporate security management. This requirement for development of the role of security structures is further emphasized when considering globalisation and the growing trend of organisations becoming transnational enterprises. 

Dalton (2003)[lxvi] observes that corporate perception of the role of security structures exist in three general stages of evolution: Physical Security Era, where the primary role is reactive loss prevention; Corporate Security or Global Security Era, defined by increased integration of security into business decisions in a proactive role, and the emergence of employee awareness programs; and finally Total Asset Protection Era, characterized by ‘a focus on addressing all of the corporation’s assets – tangible and intangible’ (Dalton, 2003:23). According to Dalton most companies still perceive the role of security structures within the charter of Physical Security or Corporate Security.

This observation is reflected in a number of approaches to prevent and deter staff dishonesty and workplace violence. The common denominator for such prevention initiatives is the introduction of employee or cultural awareness programs. Hollinger and Clark (1982)[lxvii] observed that ‘employee perceptions of informal co-worker sanctions had the strongest effect on deterring theft,’ encouraging the establishment of organisational cultures of incentives and disincentives to reduce staff dishonesty and criminal behaviour. Standing and Nicolini (1997)[lxviii] point out that definition of workplace violence should be produced locally within the individual organisation to reflect the context and culture of the organisation, the indication being that employees and employers cooperate in commitment- building programs. This approach is further recommended in the United Nations International Labour Organisation (ILO) code adopted by government nominated experts representing 12 different countries in 2003 (ILO, 2003).[lxix] The aim of employee and employer cooperation in various awareness programs is to underpin the collective perception that security is everyone’s business. The objective is to distribute accountability to all corners of the organisation and establish an organisational culture of accountability, which reflects the organisation’s social responsibility. However, there is evidence that such programs diffuse the role and responsibility of security structures within the organisation.

UN’s ‘Framework for Accountability’ distributes security responsibilities throughout the hierarchy of the organisation also placing responsibilities on the individual staff member. The findings of the two independent panels investigating bombings of UN premises in Baghdad in 2003 and in Algiers 2007 conclude that despite massive investments in the establishment of a common security management structure within the organisation, the common ‘Framework for Accountability’ is not used or disseminated widely among managers. Dalton observes a central dilemma in establishing accountability within organisational cultures: ‘Today most employees are aware of the need for security and that they have some role in protecting themselves, their colleagues and the company’s assets. On the other hand far fewer take active ownership. Often this is simply a matter of not knowing what to do’ (Dalton, 2003:183)[lxx]. This statement is supported by a recent commentary to a draft paper from the Danish Ministry of Education on policies to establish overall prevention and emergency preparedness within the Danish educational sector against so-called ‘School-shootings’ (Matz, 2009).[lxxi] The Ministry correctly places ownership and responsibility for establishing security preparedness at the local level in the organisation, at the individual school; however, the overall policy does not assign appropriate security competencies at this level to fulfil the security responsibilities. Similar observations were made in a survey of Danish transnational corporations (Matz and Runberg, 2008).[lxxii] Organisations concerned with corporate social responsibilities, labour standards, human rights and justice, health and safety and security utilize employee empowerment and awareness programs to inject accountability into the lowest levels of the organisational culture without assigning appropriate security competencies, or redefining the role of security structures. In addition to the shift in the role of security structures towards psycho-social dimensions of organisational cultures mentioned earlier, security management must include interdepartmental advisory and educational functions to enable relevant security competencies at all levels of the organisation.

Dalton supports this argument through the reorganisation of the role and responsibilities of corporate security structures into ‘three primary pillars’: Business Risk Analysis, Human Resource Security and Global Operations Support (Dalton, 2003:174). The primary pillars consist of 24 functional areas of responsibility, which comprises an extensive list of functional security responsibilities, embedding conventional security management functions into a continuum of business operations management. In view of the changing global risk-landscape, asset protection becomes focused towards protection of the organisation’s ‘Intellectual Property’, comprising added elements of unique value to the competitive edge of the organisation. Most importantly security assumes a liaison and advisory role towards various business units. Security strives to become a collaborative effort across the entire organisation in an exchange of both accountabilities and competencies, which provides a ‘principled framework’ (Jones, 2006:846)[lxxiii] promoting a social dimension of the role and nature of security structures, and enables a sense of the collective within the organisation. As such the conventional role of security management has become a role of governing security, safety and profitability across the organisation.

THE APPLIED BUSINESS CRIME MANAGEMENT MODEL

The theoretical foundation for this approach is an application of Martin Gill’s ‘Applied Crime Risk Management Model’ (Gill, 1998:15).[lxxiv] The ‘2008-Research’ (Matz and Runberg, 2008)[lxxv] argued that Gill’s Applied Crime Risk Management principles can be employed as an overall framework for the implementation of corporate security management processes and assist re-defining corporate security management strategies within organizations seeking to minimize risk to employees and assets.

The theoretical foundation of the Applied Crime Risk Management model has its origins in criminological research and situational crime reduction theories (Brantingham and Faust, 1976[lxxvi]; Clarke, 1997),[lxxvii] seeking to prevent businesses becoming victims of crime. Critics will argue that this security management model inadequately address risks emanating within the complexity of the global workplace or effectively engage the requirement for business continuity and contingency planning in a post-9/11 environment of globalization and asymmetrical threats. The criticism is basically derived from a perception that criminology and crime risk management is irrelevant within the domain of security management. However, Gill’s model provides a viable framework for the integration of new theoretical perspectives regarding corporate security management strategies (Millwee, 2002[lxxviii]; Dalton, 2003).[lxxix]

Conceptualizing and designing security management strategies specifically adjusted to the needs of the individual organization requires the introduction of a thorough decision making process primarily at corporate management level within the organization. The strength of Gill’s model is the introduction of dynamic processes in a structured promotion of security awareness cultures throughout the individual organizations:

‘The management of security measures is a dynamic process requiring a constant review of incident trends, changing legislation, corporate assets, the corporate risk ‘appetite’ and the appropriateness of security processes and documentation’ (Gill, 2008).[lxxx]

The immediate lack of security awareness in corporate boardrooms fuels the urgency in formulating distinctive corporate security strategies. In terms of corporate security different pragmatic ‘schools of thought’ evidently persist. These can be categorized in three main approaches. Some corporations have well-developed security procedures and policies, while others are striving to improve existing, but inadequate, strategies, which adapt to the changing risk-landscape. Finally few corporations are in the process of establishing security functions within the organization from scratch, in realization that corporate management is required to meet legislative and moral requirements regarding the safety of employees at the global workplace.

New theories seek to bridge the gap between criminological theory and corporate security management practices. Corporations represent a range of managerial attitudes towards corporate accountability in provision of security, which can be summarized into two main approaches: The traditional view of security as a service function incurring cost at the bottom line, and a more holistic view, which perceive corporate security functions as a contributing factor to enhance corporate accountability, reliability, and indeed success at the bottom line. Despite the differences in approach to security functions, all corporations experience the same threats and risks to their staff at the global workplace, which drives their current motivation to improve corporate security functions.

Gill, Fisher and Bowie conclude that there is a need ‘to develop workable frameworks to guide policy and to advance both the research and policy agendas to the next level of understanding, theorizing, hypotheses testing, and implementing and evaluating newly developed prevention interventions’. (Gill et al, 2002:210).[lxxxi] This requirement for a shift in research priorities can be directly related to changes in the risk-landscape and the advent of new forms of politically or religiously inspired violent crime, also described as ‘terrorism’, which increasingly target ‘ordinary people as they engage in their lawful business of shopping or working’ (Beck and Willis, 2005:140)[lxxxii]. Based on observations of terrorist attacks in the US, primarily identifying the workplace as a high-value target, Vineburgh, Ursano and Fullerton (2005)[lxxxiii] provide a draft model for workplace preparedness and resiliency, primarily through establishing professional organizational response training curriculum. The lack of training is emphasized by a survey involving 200 British mid-size companies deploying personnel abroad. The survey was conducted by Continental Research Institute on request from Armorgroup UK and found that as little as 25% of all business travellers received any form of preparatory training (ArmorGroup UK, 2006).[lxxxiv] In summary, the theoretical perspectives indicate that within the context of politically or religiously inspired workplace violence against the mobile workforce employed in transnational corporations, corporate responses should focus on ‘human continuity’ rather than operational continuity (Mankin and Perry, 2004[lxxxv]; Ursano et al, 2004[lxxxvi]; Ursano and Vineburgh, 2004).[lxxxvii] Transnational organisations comprising a diversity of organisational cultures distributed within a globalised workplace require new approaches to the provision of security, a framework that enables corporate governance of  complex psycho-social networks.

CONCLUSION

In general it can be concluded that weak cultures will determine the nature of security arrangements to a greater extent than strong organisational cultures. 

From a security perspective the social dimensions of organisational cultures pose challenges and require a change in the conventional roles of security structures towards emphasis on security strategies, which in response to internal threats adopt interdisciplinary dimensions and involve integration of all stakeholders within the organisation. The provision of security becomes a structured interdisciplinary process, which is focused towards development of corporate policies that encourage organizational security awareness through the promotion of accountability and ownership in staff dishonesty and workplace violence prevention.

The changing role of security is ultimately spurred on by a growing consciousness regarding the social dimensions in which security structures exist. The applied business crime management model provides a conceptual framework for elaborate structured processes to assimilate interdisciplinary organisational goals. Reshaping constitutional corporate security management will require cultural awareness within the organisation and an increased focus on corporate social responsibilities towards the social environment in which the organisation exists. Calls for new approaches to the role of corporate security structures are responding to the emergence of changes in public-private partnerships, the diversification of the provision of security, and the rise of the transnational private security industry. The desirable outcome is an enhancement of dynamic qualities in corporate accountability, which takes an offset in the cultural heritage of the organisation, and respond appropriately to changes in the global risk-landscape. 

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